Since the "Enlightenment" it is widely accepted that the belief in
miracles and a
commitment to modern scientific methodology are incompatible. This study
will
examine the arguments of important anti-supernatural thinkers from Spinoza
to
the present with a view to finding any common threads. Next, we will
analyze the
nature of miracles in the light of scientific methodology to see if
they are
irresolvably incompatible. Finally, we will see if a way can be found
to retain the
integrity of science without denying the credibility of the supernatural.
I. The Arguments Against Miracles.
A. Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677).
We will begin our study with the Jewish philosopher, Benedict Spinoza.
Arguing
from a Newtonian concept of nature, Spinoza insisted that "nothing then,
comes to
pass in nature in contravention to her universal laws, nay, nothing
does not agree
with them and follow from them, for . . . she keeps a fixed and immutable
order."
In fact "a miracle, whether in contravention to, or beyond, nature,
is a mere
absurdity." Spinoza was dogmatic about the impossibility of miracles
when he
proclaimed, "We may, then, be absolutely certain that every event which
is truly
described in Scripture necessarily happened, like everything else, according
to
natural laws."[1]
In support of his crucial premise Spinoza insisted that Nature "keeps
a fixed and
immutable Order." That is to say, everything "necessarily happened .
. .
according to natural laws." And "nothing comes to pass in nature in
contravention
to her universal laws . . . "[2]
Spinoza's argument can be summarized as follows:
1.Miracles are violations of natural laws.
2.Natural laws are immutable.
3.It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated.
4.Therefore, miracles are impossible.
Put in this form it is clear that the second premise is crucial: natural
laws are
universal or immutable. Just how does one know this? Laying aside for
the
moment Spinoza's deductive rationalism, from a strictly empirical point
of view
Spinoza's answer is: we know this by universal observation. That is,
we always
observe physical objects fall in accordance with Newton's law of gravitation.
There are no known exceptions. But a miracle would be an exception.
Hence,
miracles are contrary to universal scientific observation.
B. David Hume (1711-1776).
Next, let us consider briefly Hume's argument against miracles. David
Hume said
of his argument: "I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument
. . . which, if
just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all
kinds of
superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the
world
endures."[3]
Just what is this "final" argument against the miraculous? In Hume's
own words:
1."A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature."
2."Firm and unalterable experience has established these laws."
3."A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence."
4.Therefore, "the proof against miracles . . . is as entire as any argument
from experience can possibly be imagined."[4]
In this form the crucial premise is the second one which Hume explains
as
follows: "There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every
miraculous
event. Otherwise the event would not merit that appellation." So "nothing
is
esteemed a miracle if it ever happened in the common course of nature."[5]
Here again the essence of the argument depends on man's repeated observation.
For the common course of nature provides us with uniform experience
of natural
regularities. However, there is a difference between Hume and Spinoza.
For
Spinoza a scientific law was universal and immutable; hence, miracles
were
absolutely impossible. For Hume human experience is uniform and, thus,
miracles may be possible but they are incredible. So between Spinoza
and Hume
there was a softening of the basis for naturalism which corresponds
to the later
softening of the understanding of a scientific law. A scientific law
is not
necessarily universal (with no possible exception); it is simply uniform
(with no
credible exception). But even in this weaker form, Hume's argument rests
upon
the regularity of nature as opposed to the claim for highly irregular
events (such
as miracles).
C. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
There is a widely neglected argument against miracles tucked away in
Kant's
famous book, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. In his own
words,
Kant reasons this way:
Those whose judgment in these matters is so inclined that they
suppose themselves to be helpless without miracles, believe that
they soften the blow which reason suffers from them by holding that
they happen but seldom. [but we can ask] How seldom? Once in a
hundred years? . . . Here we can determine nothing on the basis of
knowledge of the object . . . but only on the basis of the maxims
which are necessary to the use of our reason. Thus, miracles must
be admitted as [occurring] daily (though indeed hidden under the
guise of natural events) or else never . . . Since the former
alternative [that they occur daily] is not at all compatible with
reason, nothing remains but to adopt the later maxim-for this
principle remains ever a mere maxim for making judgments, not a
theoretical assertion. [For example, with regard to the] admirable
conservation of the species in the plant and animal kingdoms, . . .
no
one, indeed, can claim to comprehend whether or not the direct
influence of the Creator is required on each occasion. [Kant insists]
they are for us, . . . nothing but natural effects and ought never to
be adjudged otherwise . . . To venture beyond these limits is
rashness and immodesty . . . .[6]
1.The heart of Kant's argument can be summarized as follows:
2.Everything in our experience (the world to us) is determined by practical
reason.
3.Practical reason operates according to universal laws.
4.Miracles occur either (1) daily, (2) seldom, or (3) never.
5.But what occurs daily is not a miracle since it occurs regularly according
to
natural laws.
6.And what occurs seldom is not determined by any law.
7.But all scientific knowledge must be determined by practical reason
which
operates on universal laws.
8.Therefore, it is rationally necessary for us to conclude that miracles
never
occur.
Stated this way the critical premise is the second one which claims
that practical
reason operates according to universal laws. In support of this premise
Kant
wrote, "In the affairs of life, therefore, it is impossible for us to
count on miracles
or to take them into consideration at all in our use of reason (and
reason must be
used in every incident of life)."[7]
In brief, miracles are theoretically possible but they are practically
impossible.
We must live as if they never occur. If we lived any other way it would
overthrow the dictates of practical reason and erode the basis for both
science
and morality. For both science and morality are based on universal principles.
Once more we can see that the key element in the anti-supernatural argument
is
the regularity of the operational laws of the universe. Kant believed
these regular
events to be universal. To deny them by admitting miracles, Kant thought,
would
be to deny the very basis of a rational and moral life.
D. Antony Flew (1923- ).
In his article on "Miracles" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Flew
notes that
"Hume was primarily concerned, not with the question of fact, but with
that of
evidence. The problem was how the occurrence of a miracle could be proved,
rather than whether any such events had ever occurred." However, adds
Flew,
"our sole ground for characterizing the reported occurrence as miraculous
is at
the same time a sufficient reason for calling it physically impossible."
Why is this
so? Because "the critical historian, confronted with some story of a
miracle, will
usually dismiss it out of hand . . . ." On what grounds? Flew answers,
"To justify
his procedure he will have to appeal to precisely the principle which
Hume
advanced: the 'absolute impossibility or miraculous nature' of the events
attested
must, 'in the eyes of all reasonable people . . . alone be regarded
as a sufficient
refutation.'" In short, even though miracles are not logically impossible,
they are
scientifically impossible. "For it is only and precisely by presuming
that the laws
that hold today held in the past . . . that we can rationally interpret
the detritus
[fragments] of the past as evidence and from it construct our account
of what
actually happened."[8]
Flew's argument against miracles can be summarized this way:
1.Miracles are by nature particular and unrepeatable.
2.Natural events are by nature general and repeatable.
3.Now, in practice, the evidence for the general and repeatable is always
greater than that for the particular and unrepeatable.
4.Therefore, in practice, the evidence will always be greater against
miracles
than for them.
Like the arguments of Spinoza, Hume, and Kant, the key to Flew's argument
is
premise number 3 which counts as greater evidence events which are regular
or
repeatable. For science by its very nature is not based on the exceptional
or the
odd but on the normal and the usual.
E. Alastair McKinnon.
Other contemporary philosophers have offered arguments with similar
premises
against supernatural acts. Alastair McKinnon's argument is an example.
It can be
summarized as follows:[9]
1.A scientific law is a generalization based on observation.
2.Any exception to a scientific law invalidates that law as such and
calls for
a revision of it.
3.A miracle is an exception to a scientific law.
4.Therefore, a "miracle" would call for a revision of a law and the
recognition of a broader law (which thereby explains the "miracle" as
a
natural event).
Here the critical premise is the second one. It is admitted by all that
a scientific
law is a generalization based on observation. But not all would insist
that a single
exception would invalidate a law. Even some anti-supernaturalists admit
that "This
a priori argument can be refuted by noting that a supernaturally caused
exception
to a scientific law would not invalidate it, because scientific laws
are designed to
express natural regularities."[10] But in the case of a miracle we have
"a special
and non-repeatable" exception.
From a strictly scientific perspective a non-repeatable exception is
an anomaly.
And scientists do not overthrow established laws on the basis of singular,
unrepeated anomalies. In fact, they are more likely to attribute the
anomaly to
faulty observation. At any rate, scientists do not revise laws based
on unrepeated
exceptions, since scientifically the irregular never outweighs the regular.
F. The Common Thread.
Even in this admittedly unsuccessful anti-supernatural argument is hidden
the
premise of an apparently successful one, namely the evidence for the
regular and
repeatable is always greater than that for the irregular and singular.
Science is
based on uniform experience, not anomalies. Regularity is the basis
of a scientific
understanding. Therefore, science as such can never accept the miraculous.
Thus
the principle of regularity seems to be the common thread of the anti-
supernatural arguments.
II. The Nature of Science
A. Two Fundamental Principles of Science.
It seems beyond question that science involves at least two things:
observation
and repetition. No scientific law emerges unless there has been some
observation of natural phenomena. This observation need not be strictly
empirical.
Microscopes and telescopes are legitimate extensions of man's empirical
senses.
Nor need one observe the actual event directly, as long as there are
observed
phenomena associated with the event. But there must be observation of
some
recurring pattern or else there is no scientific basis for drawing conclusions.
The events of the past, such as are indicated by the rock and fossil
record, are not
an exception to the need for observation. There were no human scientific
observers of the origin of the universe or the origin of living things.
However, our
scientific understanding of these events is dependent, nonetheless,
on
observations. It is not dependent on past observation of these events
but on
present observation of similar events. That is, all understanding of
the past is
based on the principle of uniformity, to wit, "the present is the key
to the
past."[11] This principle of uniformity means that processes observed
in the
present are the basis for a scientific approach to unobserved processes
in the
past. So even in the case of unavailable past events science is based
on
observation of similar events which repeatedly happen in the present.
B. Repetition and the Odd.
Science is so firmly based in regular repeatable events in the present
that even
when an odd event occurs scientists do not consider it part of a scientific
explanation. Thus experiments that cannot be repeated are given little
or no
validity. At least unrepeatable events are never made the basis for
an operational
law of science.
In a thought provoking article on miracles one contemporary philosopher
argued
that:[12]
1.No event can be attributed to a rational agent unless its occurrence
is
regular and repeatable.
2.Miracles are by nature not regular or repeatable.
3.Therefore, no miracle can be attributed to any rational agent (e.g.,
to God).
The crux of the argument is what he called the "repeatability requirement."[13]
Unless an event can be repeated over and over again we have no right
to claim
we know who (or what) caused it. For example, one should not make a
causal
connection between the golfer's type of swing and a
once-in-a-life-time-hole-in-one he shot. Rather than drawing a direct
causal
connection between them, we would consider it a lucky shot. And scientific
analysis is not based on fluke relations but on repeated relations.
This is why
scientists use the principle of concomitant variation. For unless there
is a direct
correlation between the presence and absence of the cause and the presence
and
absence of the effect, then there is here no scientific basis for believing
it is the
cause.
This same point applies whether the cause is a natural force or an intelligent
being. With regard to an intelligent cause, certainly no one would believe
that
there is a scientifically established causal connection between one's
intellectual
ability to pick a winning horse and a one-time win at the racetrack.
For unless the
intelligent being can do it over and over we would believe the result
was a matter
of luck, not a matter of scientific intelligence. Likewise, with regard
to
non-intelligent causes, there is no scientific basis for belief in a
causal connection
between spilt letters of alphabet cereal and a fan which blew them into
the word
"careful." Unless the fan does this repeatedly with randomly dropped
letters we
would consider this one-time event an anomaly. In such a case no scientific
causal connection will be drawn between the apparent message and the
fan.
So whether we are dealing with non-intelligent or intelligent causes,
there must be
a relationship repeatedly observed before one can consider the connection
scientifically based. But this repeated relation is precisely what we
do not-indeed,
cannot-have with miracles because they are one-time events. Hence, by
nature,
singularities such as miracles would seem to be ruled out of the realm
of science.
III. Science and the Supernatural.
If all scientific understanding of the universe is based on observed
repetitions and
if miracles are by nature singularities, then are not miracles automatically
ruled
out on scientific grounds? For miracles are by nature singular (unusual)
events
which are caused by an intelligent being (namely, God) beyond the realm
of
natural law.
A. Are Miracles a Matter of Faith?
For the supernaturalist there seem to be two basic avenues of escape
from this
argument. First, he could simply admit there is no scientific basis
for belief in
miracles. Simply because miracles are not subject to repetition does
not mean
they do not occur. After all, a hole-in-one has happened; desperation
shots have
gone through the hoop, and some have won at the lottery on the first
ticket. So all
the theist needs to admit is that singular events (such as miracles)
are not subject
to scientific analysis. That is, there may be no way to have a scientific
understanding of them; they might be understood only by "faith." In
this sense,
what the non-supernaturalist would call a "fluke" the supernaturalist
may choose
(by faith) to see as the "hand of God." Thus the theist could admit
that there is no
scientific way to differentiate between a natural statistical improbability
and a
miracle. Both would have the same empirical data associated with them
and
neither would be based in the scientific principle of repeatability.
Of course, if the theist admits this then the naturalist has won a major
victory. For
the theist has admitted that there is no scientific basis for a belief
in either the
creation of the universe or of life, to say nothing of the resurrection
of Christ.
Further, the anti-supernaturalist could press his argument that there
is no rational
or evidential grounds for belief in miracles either. For all rational
connections
seem to be based on previously observed causal connections. And all
empirical
evidence is likewise dependent on empirical observations of regular
events. In
brief, if the supernaturalist admits there is no regularly observed
phenomena as a
basis for miracles, then he has given up any basis for knowing they
have
happened. It has become simply a matter of unjustifiable faith in believing
they
have happened. If this is so then his faith is empirically unfalsifiable.
This would
not differ in principle from someone who claims his watch works because
a little
invisible green gremlin changes the time each second.
B. A Scientific Basis for the Miraculous.
However, before all is given up to fideism let us suggest another possibility
which
offers a scientific basis for belief in miracles. This approach is grounded
on the
most fundamental principle of science-the very principle of regularity
used to
argue against miracles. In order to understand this approach let us
first try to
pinpoint the basic problem in the arguments against miracles. The essence
of the
argument goes like this:
1.Only what is observed to occur over and over again can be the basis
for a
scientific understanding of what caused the event.[14]
2.Singular events like miracles are not repeated over and over again.
3.Therefore, there is no scientific basis for an understanding of what
caused
a singularity such as a miracle.
1. Antisupernaturalism Proves too Much.
The first and most obvious problem with this argument is that it seems
to prove
too much. For if the argument is valid, then it would prove that there
is no
scientific basis for some events considered to be scientific by
non-supernaturalistic scientists. For example, the Big Bang theory is
considered
by most astronomers to be a viable scientific explanation of the origin
of the
universe,[15] but so far as the scientific evidence goes the Big Bang
occurred
only once. It has not been repeated. It is a singularity. Hence, if
the repeatability
requirement is pressed it would eliminate one of the most widely held
scientific
views on the origin of the universe.
Further, most non-supernaturalist scientists believe in the spontaneous
generation
of first life on earth.[16] And even naturalists who believe life began
in outer
space, must acknowledge that it began by spontaneous generation somewhere
out
there. But to bring the problem back down to earth, most scientists
believe that
life began here only once. At the very least the spontaneous generation
of life has
not happened over and over again. What is more, we do not observe it
happening
spontaneously over and over again in the present. But if repeatability
in the
present is essential to a scientific understanding of an event, then
the belief in
spontaneous generation is not scientific either.[17]
The same logic applies to the naturalistic theory of macro-evolution.
According to
this belief, the evolutionary development of life occurred only once.
Each new
forward development occurred only once. For example fish evolved into
reptiles
only once, and reptiles evolved into birds only once. and so on. These
events have
never happened again. Yet naturalistic scientists believe it is scientific
to speak of
macro-evolution. Some even call evolution a "fact," not merely a theory.[18]
But
if it is unscientific to believe in singularities, then it would also
be unscientific to
believe in macro-evolution. In short, the naturalist's argument against
singularities
proves too much; it proves that even some of his naturalistic explanations
are not
science either.
2. Naturalism Neglects Uniformity.
In one of the strangest ironies in the history of thought, naturalism
has destroyed
its own argument by its own basic premise. For we have seen that from
Spinoza
to the present the repeatability or regularity requirement has been
part of the
anti-supernaturalists' argument against miracles. Scientific laws are
based on
repetition of events. Miracles are not repeated over and over. Therefore,
miracles
are not scientific.
Not only do naturalists hold to the need for regularities but they also
believe there
are scientific explanations for singular events (such as the origin
of life). But how
do they know this? The answer seems to be the principle of uniformity.
That is,
they insist that we can understand past singularities in terms of present
regularities. For we observe over and over in the present that when
certain
chemicals (gases) are put together under certain circumstances that
amino acids,
which are the basic elements of life, are the result. Hence, we can
assume that
the same thing would occur under similar circumstances in the past.
The same is true of macro-evolution. Scientists have observed over and
over in
the present that small changes occur in animals. Hence, they assume
that given
long periods of time in the past these small changes could add up to
the large
changes needed to explain a common ancestry of all life. So here too
the principle
of uniformity is the key. That is, even though the past event is a singularity
which the naturalist did not observe, nevertheless, there are present
regularities
(which are observed to occur over and over again) which are used as
the
scientific basis for understanding these past singularities. In this
way what is
repeated in the present is the key to understanding what happened only
once in
the past. Thus, the naturalist can avoid the charge that his view about
past
singularities is unscientific. It is scientific, they can insist, because
their
understanding of a singular event is based on similar regular events
which happen
all the time.
What is true of past singularities is also true of present ones. For
example, one
need only see one Mount Rushmore to know that some intelligence carved
these
faces on the mountain. For repeated experiences of similar situations
are a
sufficient basis for knowing that what caused this singular event must
have been
intelligent. There is an analogous situation here to the astronomical
search for
extra-terrestrial intelligence. Carl Sagan believes that even a single
message
from outer space would prove the existence of highly intelligent beings
there.[19]
How does he know this? Because he has repeated experiences of similar
messages caused by intelligent beings. So the general principle can
be stated as
follows: all singularities must be understood in terms of similar regularities.
This being the case, the objection of the supernaturalist about their
belief in
singularities without a scientific basis in repetition seems to have
collapsed. For if
one can know there is an intelligent cause of a single message (or event),
based
on repeated experience of similar situations, then why cannot one know
there was
an intelligent cause for the origin of life? In short, the answer of
the naturalist
opens the door wide for a scientific explanation for a supernatural
origin of life.
For if repetition is the key to understanding singularities, then a
supernaturalist can
argue that there was a supernatural cause for the origin of first life.
For this
reasoning is also based on repeated observation. The argument has two
sides,
both of which are based in repeated observation.
First, all observational evidence indicates that the non-living never
produces the
living. Pasteur's experiments disproved spontaneous generation long
ago.[20]
There is a uniform and universally available experience as a basis for
this
conclusion, and there are no verified exceptions. Hence, the argument
against
spontaneous generation is as firmly scientific as any such argument
can be.
There appears to be one exception to this principle that life only produces
life.
Are not scientists able to produce life? That is, cannot life be created
by intelligent
beings? In response to this two things should be noted. First of all,
scientists have
not yet created life from non-living chemicals. They have only succeeded
in
producing some biologically interesting chemicals, such as amino acids.
Furthermore, even in these experiments the role of the experimenters
plays a
crucial role in the success of the experiment.[21] Thus intelligent
intervention is
necessary in the production of these results. Hence, even if scientists
could
produce life, it would show that it took an intelligent form of life
to produce a less
than intelligent form of life. And the production of an intelligent
robot would also
show that only intelligence produces intelligence. So in any event,
the creation of
life (whether non-intelligent or intelligent life) always takes an intelligent
source of
life to accomplish it. But if this is so, then here again scientific
observation would
lead us to believe that the first living thing must have had an intelligent
cause.
Second, this leads us to the other side to this scientific argument
for an intelligent
origin of life.
1.The only cause repeatedly observed to be adequate to produce information
is intelligence.
2.Now the information in the first single cell which emerged on earth
would
fill a whole volume of an encyclopedia.[22]
3.But observation of regularities are the scientific basis for understanding
singularities.
4.Hence, there is a scientific basis (in repeated observation) for believing
that first life was caused by some intelligence beyond the natural world.
5.But since this kind of singularity produced by a supernatural intelligent
being would be a miracle by definition, then we have a firm scientific
basis
for believing in miracles.
In short, repetition in the present does give us a firm scientific basis
for believing
in an intelligent intervention into the natural world. To borrow Hume's
term, we
have "uniform experience" on which to base our belief in the miraculous
origin of
life. For we never observe an encyclopedia resulting from an explosion
in a
printing shop. We never observe a fan blowing on alphabet cereal produce
a
scientific research paper. No one would conclude Mount Rushmore resulted
from
wind or rain erosion. Why? Our uniform experience teaches us that the
kind of
information conveyed on Mount Rushmore never results from natural laws
but
only from intelligent intervention.
Summary and Conclusion
Since the rise of modern science anti-supernatural arguments have stressed
the
principle of uniformity. They have argued that:
1.Scientific understanding is always based on constant repetition of
events.
2.Miracles are not constantly repeated.
3.Therefore, there is no scientific way to understand miracles.
Two things should be noted about this argument. First, this form of
the argument
does not deny that unusual events like miracles may occur, any more
than it
denies a hole-in-one may occur. It simply says that scientific law is
based on
regularities. And until one can establish a constant conjunction between
antecedent and consequent factors there is no scientific basis for assuming
a
causal connection between them.
Second, neither does this argument deny that there is any scientific
way to
analyze singularities, such as the origin of the universe, or the origin
of life, or
receiving one message from outer space. It simply says that observed
regularities must be the basis for analyzing singularities. For example,
if we
observe over and over again that a certain kind of effect regularly
results from a
certain kind of cause then when we discover even a singular case of
this kind of
effect (whether from the past or present), we have a scientific basis
for assuming
it had the same kind of cause too. This same assumption is behind the
naturalists'
search for a chemical basis for the origins of life and an evolutionary
basis for the
origin of species. In both cases repeatable observations in the present
are used as
a basis for understanding the singularity of origin in the past. Without
this principle
of uniformity there would be no way of getting at singularities in either
the past or
the present.
Certainly we must grant that this is a legitimate procedure to base
all scientific
understanding in the principle of regularity. However, the question
is this: Does
such a procedure eliminate a scientific understanding of miracles? In
order to
better understand our answer to this question let us reformulate the
naturalist
argument in the light of the two qualifications noted above.
1) Scientific understanding is always based on constant repetition of
events.
la) This repetition need not be a repetition of the event we are analyzing
but only
of other similar events.
2) Miracles are not constantly repeated events.
3b) Therefore, miracles need not be eliminated from the realm of scientific
understanding.
Once the argument is put in this form we can see that all one needs
to do to
establish a basis for singularities such as miracles is to find some
constantly
repeated process as a basis for understanding them. This we believe
can be done
by adding these premises:
4) Constant repetition informs us that wherever complex information
is conveyed
there was an intelligent cause.
5) There are some scientific singularities (such as the origin of first
life) where
complex information is conveyed.
6) Therefore, there is a scientific basis for positing an intelligent
non-natural cause
for the origin of first life.
Certainly no one can reasonably deny the information comes from an informer.
This is a uniform experience. The only apparent exceptions are flukes
which
cannot be repeated constantly. So firmly established is our uniform
experience
that only intelligence causes information that we would consider it
highly
unscientific for a geology teacher to insist that his students continue
to study the
faces on Mount Rushmore until they can find some natural law of erosion
which
can explain them. Furthermore, one does not have to see more than one
Mount
Rushmore to know that it was formed by intelligence, not by natural
processes of
erosion. For uniform experience of similar situations indicates that
these kinds of
forms on rocks always result from intelligent intervention. Likewise,
if a single
sentence or paragraph is repeatedly observed to result from intelligence,
then the
encyclopedia full of information contained in the first simple form
of life surely
must have had an intelligent cause too.
Should someone protest that there is still a chance-remote as it may
be- that life
arose naturally, we need only remind them that science is not based
on flukes or
anomalies. It is based on regularities and repetition. And we have no
observed
regularly repeated conjunctions that would provide a scientific basis
for us to
believe in such an unrepeated singularity. In brief, the principle of
repeatability
which naturalists use to attack miracles actually boomerangs to support
the
miraculous. Naturalism is defeated at its own game of science on its
own
principles.
NOTES
1.Benedict De Spinoza, Tractatus Theologica-Pliticus, in The Chief
Works of Benedict de Spinoza, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (London: George
Bell and Sons, 1883), 1:83, 87, 92.
2.Ibid., p. 83.
3.David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. C. W.
Hendel (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 10.1.118.
4.Ibid., pp. 118-123.
5.Ibid., pp. 10.1.122-123.
6.Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, 2nd ed.,
trans. T. M.Green and H. H. Hudon (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960),
pp. 83-84.
7.Ibid., p. 82.
8.Anthony Flew, "Miracles" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1967),
5.346-353.
9.Alastair McKinnon, "Miracle' and 'Paradox'" in American Philosophical
Quarterly 4 (Oct. 1967): 308-14.
10.Malcolm L. Diamond, "Miracles," Religious Studies 9 (Sept., 1973),
316-317.
11.Charles Lyell (1797-1876), the father of modern uniformitarianism,
wrote: It may be necessary in the present state of science to supply
some part of the assumed course of nature hypothetically; but if so,
this must be done without any violation of probability, and always consistently
with the analogy of what is known both of the past and present economy
of our system." See his Principles of Geology (New York: D. Appleton
and Company, 1887), p. 229.
12.George D. Chryssides, "Miracles and Agents," Religious Studies
11 (Sept., 1975), 319-27.
13.Ibid., p. 322.
14.This point was made by Paley in his famous watchmaker argument,
but it seems to have been largely lost in the subsequent arguments against
God. For example, Paley used phrases like "we observe," "our observer,"
"each observation," "Our observation" over and over again. He even used
the phrase "uniform experience" as the basis for his belief in an intelligent
Designer of nature. (See William Paley, A View of the Evidences of Christianity
(Cambridge: J. Hall & Sons, 1875), 6th ed., pp. 10, 11, 20, 29 and
especially 37-38.
15.See Robert Jastrow, God and the Astronomers (New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, Inc., 1978), especially pp. 14, 111, 116 and 120f.
16.George Wald wrote, "We tell this story [about Pasteur's experiments]
to beginning students of biology as though it represents a triumph of
reason over mysticism. In fact it is very nearly the opposite. The reasonable
view was to believe in spontaneous generation; the only alternative,
to believe in a single, primary act of supernatural creation. There
is no third position." See "The Origin of Life" in Scientific American
(Aug., 1954), p. 48; reprinted in Life: Origin and Evolution, ed. C.
E. Folsome (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979).
17.Many scientists recognize this point. J. W. N. Sullivan wrote:
"So far as actual evidence goes, this is still the only possible conclusion.
But since it is a conclusion that seems to lead back to some supernatural
creative act, it is a conclusion that scientific men find very difficult
of acceptance" (The Limitations of Science, New York: Mentor Book, 1963,
p . 94). Speaking of spontaneous generation, Robert Jastrow said, the
"theory is also an act of faith. The act of faith consists in assuming
that the scientific view of the origin of life is correct, without having
concrete evidence to support that belief" (Until the Sun Dies, New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1977, p. 63).
18.Isaac Asimov said, "Scientists who deal with evolution as their
field of specialization may argue over the mechanism behind evolutionary
development, but none questions the fact of evolution itself" (Science
Digest, October, 1981, p. 86).
19.Sagan wrote: "There are others who believe that our problems are
soluble, that humanity is still in its childhood, that one day soon
we will grow up. The receipt of a single message from space would show
that it is possible to live through such technological adolescence:
the transmitting civilization, after all, has survived. Such knowledge,
it seems to me, might be worth a great price" (Broca's Brain, New York:
Random House, 1979, p. 275, emphasis added).
20.See Note 17 above.
21.See the excellent new book by some creative scientists on this
point: Charles Thaxton, Walter Bradley, and Roger Olsen, The Mystery
of Life's Origin: Reassessing Current Theories (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1984).
22.The information in a complex form of life is much greater. Carl
Sagan pointed out that "If written out in English, say, that information
[in the human brain] would fill some twenty million volumes, as many
as in the world's largest libraries" (Cosmos, New York: Random House,
1980, p. 278).
Norman L. Geisler is president of Southern Evangelical Seminary
in Charlotte, North Carolina, and is the author of more than 40 books,
including Creating God in the Image of Man? The New "Open"
View of God Neotheisms Dangerous Drift (Bethany House,
1997).
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